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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Harrison Gamino appeals from the district court's Order Re: Conditional 
Admission to Probation Violation. Mr. Gamino admitted to violating probation but 
preserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss the violation. He 
asserts that, because the petition to revoke his probation was filed after his period of 
probation had expired, the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
On February 18, 2004, Mr. Gamino was charged with two counts of burglary and 
one count of grand theft. (R., p.31.) Mr. Gamino pleaded guilty to one count of 
burglary, and on May 10, 2004, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with five years fixed, and the court suspended the sentence and placed 
Mr. Gamino on probation for a period of four years. (R., p.49-50.) His period of 
probation, therefore, was set to expire on May 10, 2008. 
On July 21, 2005, the State filed a Petition To Revoke Probation, asserting 
several probation violations. On November 7, 2005, the district court entered an Order 
On Motion To Revoke Probation. (R., p.138.) Rather than revoking probation, the 
district court ordered, "that the defendant's sentence will be further suspended and 
probation is continued under the same terms and conditions as previously imposed," 
with several additional terms of probation. (R., p.140.) 
On May 16, 2008, six days after the four-year period of probation expired, the 
State filed another Petition To Revoke Probation. (R., p.156.) The Report of Probation 
violation, which was attached to the petition, is dated May 8, 2008. (R., p.182.) The 
report of violation alleges that Mr. Gamino still owed $4,591.00 and had failed to follow 
through with the payment plan ordered by the district court. (R., p.182.) It further 
alleged that he owed $300.00 in supervision fees. (R., p.183.) 
Mr. Gamino filed a Motion To Dismiss Probation Violation, asserting that his 
probation expired on May 10, 2008, and because the State's petition was not filed in the 
district court until May 16, 2008, the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation. 
(R., p.190.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.193.) Mr. Gamino then entered 
into a Conditional Admission To Probation Violation, wherein he admitted to the 
violation but reserved his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss. 
(R., p.395.) The district court entered an order on the conditional admission, extending 
Mr. Gamino's probation for another period of two years, but providing that probation 
would be terminated upon payment of restitution and fees. (R., pp.199-200.) 
Mr. Gamino appealed. (R., p.201.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying 
his motion to dismiss because his probation had expired by the time the State filed its 
petition to revoke probation. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gamino's motion to dismiss where probation 
had expired by the time the State filed its petition to revoke probation? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Denyina Mr. Gamino's Motion To Dismiss Because 
Mr. Gamino's Probation Had Expired Bv The Time The State Filed Its Petition To 
Revoke Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gamino asserts that, because his probation expired on May 10, 2008, and 
the petition to revoke his probation was not filed until May 16, 2008, the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the State's petition and erred by denying the motion to 
dismiss on this basis 
B. The District Court Erred Bv Denying Mr. Gamino's Motion To Dismiss Because 
Mr. Gamino's Probation Had Expired When The State Filed Its Petition To 
Revoke Probation 
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. By the terms of his probation 
I agreement, Mr. Gamino's period of probation expired on May 10, 2008. Six days after 
1 Mr. Gamino's probation expired, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation 
I 
because Mr. Gamino had not paid restitution or fees. Mr. Gamino asserts that, because 
the State's petition was not filed before May 10, 2008, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to act on the State's petition and the district court therefore, erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss on this basis. 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Harvey, 142 ldaho 727, 730, 132 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 2006) 
I 
i (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect 
I to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Id. (citing State v. 
Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 ldaho 
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 ldaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 
67 (Ct. App. 2000)). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning. Id. (citing Burnight, 132 ldaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219.) If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Id. (citing Escobar, 134 ldaho at 
389, 3 P.3d at 67). When this Court engages in statutory construction, it has the duty to 
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Id. (citing Rhode, 133 ldaho 
at 462, 988 P.2d at 688). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the 
literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 
policy behind the statute, and the legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon the Court 
to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. Id. (citing State v. 
Beard, 135 ldaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001)). A construction of a 
statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. Id. (citing State v. Doe, 140 
ldaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 ldaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 
ldaho Code § 20-222 states: 
The period of probation or suspension of sentence may be indeterminate 
or may be fixed by the court, and may at any time be extended or 
terminated by the court. Such period with any extension thereof shall not 
exceed the maximum period for which the defendant might have been 
imprisoned. 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may 
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or 
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. 
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation 
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be 
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may 
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. 
I.C. 3 20-222 (emphasis added). Therefore, at any time during probation, the district 
court may issue a warrant for violation of any of the conditions of probation and cause 
the defendant to be arrested. I.C. § 20-222. Thereupon, the court may revoke or 
continue probation. I.C. 3 20-222. However, I.C. 3 19-2602 states: 
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions 
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of 
them have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court, 
the court may, at any time within the longest period for which the 
defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the court, 
issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant. 
I.C. 5 19-2602 (emphasis added). This statute seems to suggest that, so long as 
probation revocation proceedings are commenced within the time period for which a 
defendant might have been sentenced, the revocation is timely. However, this directly 
conflicts with the language of I.C. § 20-222, which requires that revocation proceedings 
occur "during probation." I.C. § 20-222. 
To the extent that these statutes conflict, I.C. § 20-222 applies. The rule of lenity 
requires that courts construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused. 
State v. Shanks, 139 ldaho 152, 156, 75 P.3d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 2003). Further, if 
I.C. 9 19-2602 were to control, the language or section 20-222 would be rendered 
meaningless. Finally, the Court of Appeals has clearly stated, "we . . . hold that so long 
as probation revocation proceedings are commenced during the period of probafion, the 
court acts within its authority set forth in I.C. § 20-222 to revoke or continue probation." 
Harvey, 142 ldaho at 731,132 P.3d at 1259. 
However, in this case, the district court held that I.C. 5j 19-2602 applied. (811 1/08 
Tr., (3.17, Ls. 15-23.) Specifically, the court stated: 
In this case, I'm going to - my determination is going to be that the 
allegation is that the probation was not complied with during - the 
allegation arose during the four-year term in which the defendant was on 
probation and that the motion by the prosecutor is timely under 19-2602. 
It was at least signed before the probation terminated. It was not filed 
before the probation period set by the Court was terminated, but it was 
fielding during the 10-year period under 19-2602. 
(8/11/08 Tr., p.17, Ls. 15-23.) The district court erred by applying I.C. 5 19-2602 rather 
than I.C. 5 20-222. The rule of lenity requires any conflict between these statutes be 
interpreted in favor of Mr. Gamino and applying I.C. § 19-2602 renders I.C. 5 20-222 
meaningless. Probation revocation proceedings must be commenced during the period 
of probation and in this case they were not. 
Further, the fact that the report of probation violation was created on May 8, 
2008, and signed by the Department of Probation and Parole on May, 9, 2008, is 
irrelevant. (R., pp.182-183.) Probation revocation proceedings must be "commenced 
during the period of probation." Harvey, 142 Idaho at 731, 132 P.3d at 1259 (emphasis 
added). The fact that the report was signed before the period of probation expired does 
not mean that revocation proceedings were "commenced." The petition to revoke 
probation was filed on May 16, 2008, and this is the date that controls. (R., p.156.) The 
fact that the report was created and signed by a member of Department of Probation 
and Parole signifies only that the claims were being investigated by the Department; 
nothing was commenced in district court until May 16. (See R., p.3 (Register of 
Actions).) 
Criminal cases are commenced by the actual filing of an information or an 
indictment. See State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). They 
are not commenced by the prosecutor deciding to file a charging document. Likewise, 
revocation proceedings are not commenced simply because the Department decides to 
issue a report of probation violation. They are commenced when an actual petition is 
filed in district court. 
Finally, May 10, 2008, was the actual date that the period of probation expired 
and there is no argument that Mr. Gamino's period of probation had been tolled. In 
Harvey, the Court of Appeals discussed whether periods of probation can be tolled 
under I.C. $20-222. In Harvey, the defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of 
twenty years for lewd conduct with a minor. Harvey, 142 Idaho at 728, 132 P.3d at 
1256. Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the court suspended the sentence and 
placed Harvey on probation for a period of seven years. Id., 142 ldaho at 729, 132 P.3d 
at 1257. 
in 1989, the State filed a petition to revoke probation due to the fact that 
Mr. Harvey had remained away from his residence and had failed to inform his 
probation officer that he intended to change his residence. Id. Mr. Harvey was arrested 
on the violation in December, 1989. Id. Mr. Harvey admitted to the violations and on 
March 9, 1990, the district court continued his probation and ordered that he serve 
ninety days in jail. Id. On March 22, the State filed another petition for probation 
violation, asserting that Mr. Harvey had escaped from jail. Id. On March 23, the district 
court issued a warrant, which was served on October 9, 1991, in another state. Id. On 
December 6, the district court again continued Mr. Harvey's probation. Id. 
On March 24, 1992, the State filed yet another petition for probation violation 
which was not served on Mr. Harvey until April 15, 1997 in another state. Id. On 
June 17, 1997, the court revoked Mr. Harvey's probation and executed his sentence. 
In 2002, Mr. Harvey filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that 
the maximum period of time he could have been placed on probation was five years, 
and therefore his probation expired in 1991. Id. Alternatively, he asserted that because 
his probationary period was seven years, and it had never been extended by the court, 
his probation expired in 1993. Id. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that Mr. Harvey's period of probation 
had been tolled. The court stated, "[tlo determine that the tolling rule did not apply in 
this case and that the district court's jurisdiction over Harvey had expired would lead to 
a patently absurd result and nullify legislative intent that probation rehabilitate the 
defendant while protecting society." Id., 142 ldaho at 731, 132 P.3d at 1259. The court 
stated: 
[w]e therefore conclude that the ldaho legislature could not have intended 
for a probationer to have the ability to avoid the conditions of probation 
entirely by absconding from supervision until the probationary period 
expired. Thus, we hold that a probationary period is tolled form the date 
probation revocation proceedings are commenced until probation is 
continued or revoked. 
Id. Mr. Gamino acknowledges that prior probation revocation proceedings were 
commenced against him in this case. On July 21, 2005, the State filed a Petition To 
Revoke Probation, asserting several probation violations. On November 7, 2005, the 
district court entered an Order On Motion To Revoke Probation. (R., p.138.) Rather 
than revoking probation, the district court ordered, "that the defendant's sentence will be 
further suspended and probation is continued under the same terms and conditions as 
previously imposed," with several additional terms of probation. (R., p.140.) However, 
there are several reasons that his probation period should not be tolled. 
First, the district court, when it continued probation, did not extend the 
probationary period. (R., p.140.) Second, the district court in this case specifically held 
that tolling did not apply because Mr. Gamino had not absconded from probation and 
that the period of probation expired on May 10, 2008. (8/11108 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-24.) 
The court asked the prosecutor, ''just removing issues here, there's no argument that 
the defendant absconded and the probation period is extended because he absconded; 
am I correct here?" (8/11/08 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5.) The prosecutor responded, "[tlhat is 
correct." (8/11/08 Tr., p.14, L.6.) Finally, there is no policy reason for extending the 
period of probation in this case. There is no dispute that Mr. Gamino did not abscond 
and that he was being supervised. The Department of Probation and Parole had every 
opportunity to file the probation violation and have a warrant served on Mr. Gamino 
within the probationary period. It simply failed to do so. Therefore, as the district court 
found, Mr. Gamino's probation expired on May 10, 2008. Because the State failed to 
file its petition to revoke probation by that date, the district court erred by denying 
Mr. Gamino's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gamino requests that the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss 
be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. 
Deputy State A pel1 te Public Defender t) 
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